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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the effects on real income and the price level of
the 1973—1974 oil price increase are quite ambiguous on both theoretical and
empirical grounds. The theoretical analysis reviews standard results and
extends them to analyze the steady—state equilibrium and endogenous monetary
policy reaction functions. It is shown that standard models and parameter
values imply trivial reductions in real income and ambiguously signed
changes in the price level. It is noted, however, that other special
models can rationalize empirical findings of large effects. Direct real—
oil—price effects in an extended Barro—Lucas real income equation are esti-
mated for eight countries. Although statistically significant and substan-
tial direct effects are found for about half the countries, it is noted
that these coincided with countries undergoing price decontrol during 1973—
1974. Thus price-control biases in real GNP data provide an acceptable
alternative explanation for the estimated effects. Simulation experiments
in an international model illustrate the wide range of real income and
price level effects which are consistent with the data. Further research is
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The increase in the real price of oil during 1973—1974 is widely be-
lieved to have been a major cause of inflation both in the United States
and abroad. In part, this belief is based on a partial equilibrium (or
adding—up) approach which explains the inflation rate as the weighted sum
of the inflation rates of individual goods and services without making due
allowance for the general equilibrium effects on factor prices of an increase
in the relative price of an imported factor. But theoretically acceptable
arguments canbemade which attribute inflation ——orat least an upward
price level shift ——tofactors decreasing the real quantity of money de-
manded or increasing the nominal quantity of money supplied by the central
banks. This paper reports an empirical investigation of the magnitude of
these possible effects consistent with general equilibrium.
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First a theoretical analysis of the long—run and short—run effects of
an oil—pricechange ispresented in Section I.It is seen there that the
long—runeffecton real income and the real quantity of money demanded may
be quite small if not negligible, particularly when real income is measured
in terms of real GNP and money is deflated by the corresponding implicit
deflator. While this result may be due to the use of a three—factor Cobb—
Douglas production function in the context of a neoclassical growth model,
it certainly illustrates that a long—run reduction of real GNP of even 1 or
2 percent is very much an empirical question. Short—run effects on real
income and prices associated with shifts in aggregate demand and supply
appear to be similar in magnitude to those for the long run. Central banks'
reaction to the short—run real income and inflation effects may offset or
reinforce these effects once monetary policy is allowed to be endogenous.
Tests of significance of oil—price variables in an extended Lucas—
Barro real income equation are reported in Section II. The results are mixed and
confounded by price control and decontrol programs which were widespread
at nearly the same time as the 1973—1974 oil—price change. Much future
work is required to definitively disentangle the effects of these two
factors.
Section III reports simulation experiments on the effects of the 1973—
1974 oil—price change. These experiments are conducted using the Mark IV
Simulation Model presented in Darby (1980b). This model ——asimplified
version of the Mark III International Transmission Model' ——isa quarterly
macroeconometric model of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Netherlands. In addition to the basic Mark
IVModel, an extended Mark IV—OilModel is used which incorporates oil—price3
variables in the real—income equations for those five countries for which
the variables were found to be significant in Section II. Using the basic
model, some notable effects are found as a result of induced movements in
exports, exchange rates, money supplies, and the like. Strongereffects
are simulated using the Mark IV—Oil Model, but the price—control caveatof
Section II again applies.
The concluding section sunimarizes the results of this paper and sug-
gests areas for future research as international data on theeffects of the
1979—1980 oil—price increase come available.4
I. Theory
The price level, measured in dollars per basket of goods, is the in-
verse of the price of money, goods per dollar. So it is convenient to
classify the forces determining the price level according whether they in-
fluence the supply of or demand for money.
A standard (long—run) money—demand function explains the real quantity
of money demanded by real income y and the nominal interest rate R. The
nominal quantity demanded Ndisthe product of this real demand and the
price level:
(1) Nd= md(y,R)P




That is, the price level equals the ratio of the nominal quantity of money
supplied to the real quantity of money demanded.
Although the inflationary impact of an oil—price change is generally
analyzed given an exogenously determined nominal money supply, this maybe
misleading or at least counterfactual. That is, to the extent thatthe oil—
price change increases the price level and unemployment (at leasttemporarily)
and decreases real income for a given nominal money supply, the inflationary
effect would induce central banks to reduce M5 while the recessionary effect
tends to increase MS.Whicheffect is dominant would depend on the relative
weights which the individual central bank puts on inflation and unemploy-
ment. In addition, other factors ——discussedbelow —mayinfluencecentral
bank policy response to an oil—price change. With this warning, let us5
proceed for now to analyze the effects of an oil—price change for an
exogenous monetary policy.
Long—Run (Full Employment) Effects
Consider first the long—run effects of an oil price change on real
output. For illustrative purposes suppose real output y is produced ac-
cording to a 3—factor Cobb—Douglas production function using domestic
capital k, labor £,andimported petroleum
(3) y =
(4) cx++y=l
Letusassume that output is produced by competitors who treat all prices
as parametric including in particular the real price of oilO. In equil-
ibrium, one of the first order conditions requires that the marginal product
of petroleum be equated to its real price:
(5) =yki'=0
It is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium usage of petroleum as a
function of 0, k, and £:
(6) =
If we now substitute this equilibrium 4intothe production function (3) we
obtain equilibrium real output as a function of the real price of oil and
given, fully—employed resources of capital and labor:
(7) y =6
Taking logarithms and differentiating, we find the elasticity of equilibrium





If for example, y were on the order of 0.01, a 1 percent increase in the
real oil price would decrease real output by only 0.01 percent (1 basis
point) for given resources and given the assumptions of this illustration.4
The full, long—run equilibrium effect would be slightly larger due
to a reduction in the steady—state capital—labor ratio for a given growth
path of labor. To see this, suppose that saving and investment k is a
constant fraction 0ofdomestic factor income:
(9) I=o(y—O)
Dividing both sides of (9) by k and noting that y —= (a+)y,
V
(10) =o(a+
Thus the growth rate of capital is a fixed proportion of the output—capital
ratio. In view of (7), this latter ratio is
(11) •=fy\a+6fi\a+
k6) kJ
The simple neoclassical growth model can therefore be applied which, after
tedious manipulations, yields the result that
(12) d1ogy
diogO
This effect which allows for the (proportionate) reduction In the capital
stock would be about a third larger than that in (8) for given resources7
and a labor share equal to three quarters of value added. Weshould note
that since income and capital fall proportionately in fullsteady—state
equilibrium, there is no long-run effect on the real interest rate.5
A curiosity of national income accountingproves important in applying
the analysis to empirical data. Gross national product isa value—added
concept so that imported inputs are subtracted from total output to obtain
GNP. This works fine for nominal GNP or Q:
(13) Q =Py—(P6)P(l—y)y
So nominal GNP is simply the price of output P times real domestic factor
income (1 —y)y.However, in computing real GNP or q, imported inputs are
valued at base—year relative prices e:
0
(14)
Thusmeasured real GNF rises relative to factor income (1 —y)ywhen the
real oil price 0 is increased. Nominal aggregate demand as measured by
nominal GNP is not affected sinc there is an offsetting measurement error






Wecan differentiate (14) to find the elasticity of real GNP with
respect to the real oil price as:
(16)d log g= +d log y
dlog0O—y diogO
For small changes In ebeforethe capital stock adjusts,68
(17)dlogg ___— —o dloge —l—yl—y
Thus we see that in the neighborhood of the original oil price, the output
effect is completely masked in measured GNP. However, for large changes in
erelativeto 0 such as those occurring in 1973—1974, there would be a nega-
tive effect on measured real GNP.7 Using t for the change relative to base
year prices we have
(18) Liog q =log_ + log (0Th
where is from (8) or (12) depending on whether or not the capital
stock is presumed to have adjusted.8 Note that the deflator is decreased
relative just as real GNP is increased
relative to real factor incomes.
In summary, an increase in the real price of oil is predicted to de-
crease real output by the logarithmic change times1 beforecapital
adjusts or timeswhen capital is fully adjusted. However, such an oil
price change will cause a partially offsetting overstatement of measured
rca]. GNP (and understatement of the GNP deflator).
Obviously the values of y andare of considerable interest. For
current illustrative purposes, only petroleum imports will be considered.9
To the extent that petroleum imports are for resale to consumers rather
than used in production they have no effect on output or measured GM' (real
or nominal). Thus the ratio of the value of petroleum imports to GNP
serves as an upper limit on y. If we use pre—change U.S. data, this upper
limit would be about 0.003 for 1970. In 1976, this share had risen to 0.02.
This rise in the share could indicate inelastic consumer demand for imported
petroleum products, a problem with the Cobb—Douglas production function, or9
both. So while 0.003 should be an upper limit for y if the Cobb—Douglas
function is correct, 0.02 will also be considered as an upper—upper limit.
Finally suppose that a/Ca + )and/(a + )havetheir traditionally
estimated values of 1/4 and 3/4. Then the multiplier —y/(l —y)is —0.003
or —0.020 depending on y. The corresponding multipliers allowing for
capital stock change are —0.004 and —0.027. The real price of a barrel of
crude oil increased some 3.57 fold from 1973 I to 1974 I (a logarithmic in-
crease of 1.273). This is surely an upper limit on 0/0 for all petroleum
products. Table 1 presents estimates of the maximum effects on output and
measured real GNP. We see that the maximum full adjustment effects on real
output range from a decrease of 0.5 to 3.5 percent according to whether
one takes a pre—change or post—change estimate of y. For measured real GNP
the corresponding decreases are only 0.3 to 2.0 percent. Even smaller
changes correspond to the intermediate period corresponding to full—employ-
ment of resources but no adjustment of the capital stock.
Rasche and Tatom have long argued for much larger real—income effects
of the oil—price change. They rely upon regression estimates of the quasi—
production function (7) and find much larger values ofthan considered
here. Part of that difference is illusory: They use a much broader energy
price index which has a logarithmic increase of only 0.408 from 1972 to
10
1974compared to the 1.273 increase for a banel of oil used here; so the
larger elasticity is offset by a lower value of log (0/0). Further they
do not take account of the biases in reported real GNP so that their esti-
mates may refer to the output effect rather than the GNP effect. Finally,
in their (1980) paper, they report an equation (6) in which they estimate
the production function (3) directly (after taking logs) and also add10
log 0 separately. The estimated y is0.05 while the coefficient on log 6
is —0.07. Using '0.05, 0.70 (as reported), and log (0/6)0.408,
we get an output change of —0.0215 with no capitaladjustment and of —0.0291
with capital adjustment, which is in the same ball park asthe figures in
Table 1. It is the things other than in the productionfunction ——cap-
tured in the log 0 coefficient of —0.07 ——whichpermit such big estimates.
These other things may have to do with cyclical factors,induced monetary
policy, or fortuitous removal of pricecontrols at roughly the same time
as discussed below. Further the 0.05estimate ofmay be biased upward if
energy usage (relative to capitaland labor) serves as an indicator of
whether the economy is in a boom or recession. Thus theRasche and Tatom
conclusions may have weak empirical foundations.
This exercise has shown that even a huge change in the real priceof
oil such as in 1973—1974 may result in very small if not negligibleeffects
on real output and especially upon measured real GNP.Different assumptions
would result in different results, but the model used is surely astandard
one in practice. Thus it would appear to be an empirical questionas to
whether the oil—price change had any significant long—run effect onmeasured
real GNP.
We can now return to our original question of the long—run effectof
the oil—price change on the real quantity of money demanded and hence,
given the nominal money supply, on the price level.First we note that in
long—run equilibrium real income is reduced by a constantfraction but the
growth rate of real income is reduced only temporarily duringthe transi-
tional period. Second we note that the real interest rate is unchanged.
Under these conditions, in long—run equilibrium the real and nominalinter-
est rate will be unchanged and the real quantity of money demandedwill11
behave similarly to real income ——adownward parallel shift initsgrowth
path. The logarithmic downward shift will equal to the elasticity of real
money demand with respect to real income times the logarithmic shift in
real income. Thus, if this income elasticity is around 1 there will be a
long—run increase in the price level equal to the long—run decrease in real
income. If during the earlypart of the adjustment period the price
level effect exceeds this long—run effect, then the inflation rate must be
reduced (ceteris paribus) below what it would otherwise be to reach long—
run equilibrium.
Twoproblemsmay arise in econometric work based on real GNP as
measured in the national income accounts. First, the reduction in measured
real GNT will understate the output reduction which actually occurs. A
second problem arises only if the income elasticity of the demand for money
differs significantly from unity: Then the offsetting measurement errors
in real GNP and the GNP deflator would cause an apparent shift in the money—
demand function equal to the product of the measurement error and the dif-
ference of the elasticity from 1. This latter problem is a second—order
matter which will not be pursued further in this paper.
Short—Run Effects
Short—run effects of the 1973—1974 oil—price shock have been analyzed
in terms of induced shifts in aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves
under the assumption that nominal wages are predetermined (or at least
sticky) in the short run. As with the long—run analysis, the analysis of
the short—run effects proceeds on the assumption that the government's
monetary and fiscal policy is unaffected by the unexpected oil—price in-
crease.12
The aggregate demand effects of an oil—price shock can be viewed as
analogous to that of an increase intaxes.'2 Assume for simplicity that in
the short—run both producer and consumer demands for imported petroleum are
perfectly inelastic. For producers, this means that higher import prices
will be paid out of reduced quasi—rents, reducing private income. For
consumers, higher oil prices would directly reduce expenditures onother
consumption goods for given private income and these expenditures would be
further reduced by the reduction of privateincome.'3 Thus, at initial
levels of real income and interest rates, aggregate expenditures would fall
unless increased demand for exports by oil exporters equals or exceeds the
induced reduction in consumption. When we allow for some elasticity of
demand for imported oil and for increased exports of goods to oil producers,
the plausible magnitude of these basically distributional effects is sharply
reduced and could even bereversed.14 In what follows, we shall nonetheless
consider the possibility of a small decrease in aggregate demand.
The aggregate supply effect would appear more substantial and has been
analyzed on varying assumptions by Bruno and Sachs (1979), Hudsonand Jor-
genson (1978), Nork and Hall (1979), Norsworthy, Harper,and Kunze (1979),
Phelps (1978), and Rasche and Totoni (1977a, 1980). Followingthe latter authors,
suppose that the short—run conditions underlyingthe aggregate supply curve are
fixity of the capital stock, the nominal wage W, and the real priceof oil.
Using the aggregate production function (3), one can readilyderive output as
(19) y =()() k
On comparing (19) and (7), we note that for a given price levelthere is a
much greater output effect with nominal wages fixed than when laboris assumed13





Note that the elasticity of theaggregate supply curve is
(21) dlogy = dlogpa
It is convenient to plotaggregate supply and demand curves in terms
of log y and log P so that slopes andelasticities have a simplecorrespondence.
The logarithmic aggregate supplycurve corresponding to equation (19) is
(22) log y =log(/W) +logy +logkj —log e +logp
This is plotted as S in Figure 1 forgiven values of k, W, and the base—
year relative price of oil 8. The slope of S is theinverse (a/s) of the
elasticity of aggregate supply. Anaggregate demand curve D is also drawn
to determine short—run output and theprice level, y and
As can be seen in equation (22)an increase in the real price of oil
shifts the aggregate supply curvehorizontally by —log(8/0) as illustrated
in Figure 2.16 This can alternativelybe described as an upward shiftequal
to minus the slope of S times the horizontalshift
(23)
(_) (
log (0/0)) =- log(6/)
If any shift in the aggregate demandcurve is negligible, the new equilibrium
output and price level are y and P. The short—rundisplacement in output
from that corresponding to the basereal oil price 0 is
(24) Llog y =a•l log (0/)14
where riD is the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve so that cx/ and
1/riD are the slopes of the aggregate supply and demand curves respectively.
Suppose that the aggregate demand curve is unit elastic —1),then
(25) tlog y =— lJlog (6/0)
which is identical to the long—run effect implied by (8) before the capital
stock adjusts. The increase in the price level,
(26) Lilog P = L.1ogy = log(e/),
reducesreal wages just sufficiently to maintain employment at the natural
level. Thus, absent a shift in the aggregate demand curve, employment rises
or falls (and output is greater or less than the given—capital long—run
level indicated by (25)) according to whether the elasticity of aggregate
demand is smaller or greater than 1 in absolute value. If aggregate demand
were inelastic, increased employment would lessen the short—run decline in
output. In Darby (1976c, pp. 161—163) I have argued that short—run and
hence transitory movements in output will induce much less than proportionate
movements in money demand, which suggests that the short—run aggregate
demand curve is in fact elastic.17 This would imply a short—run reduction
in employment, which would accentuate the initial fall in output predicted
by the full—employment analysis.18 Once expected nominal wages are reduced,
this difference would disappear. In addition, the aggregate demand curve
may shift to the left as previously argued if there is a distributional
effect due to faster decreases in consumer spending than increases in oil—
exporter spending, this is illustrated in Figure 3.15
Again it must be emphasized that these calculations are only illustra-
tive of the sort of effects which might be expected. If, for example, we
assumed partial adjustment of nominal wages to their equilibrium values,
the aggregate supply curve would be less elastic and the output change would
be more closely tied to the change in the given—capital long—run level of
19
output.
The aggregate demand curve is derived using our price level equation
(2) so the short—run price level effect
(28) Alog P =logy
D
is valid for the short—run period in which IS—LM analysis is applicable. If
—
1/nD
is less than the long—run elasticity of demand for money with respect
to output, the short—run increase in the price level would be less than
that associated with an equal long—run decrease in output.
Note that the same accounting problems in relating output and the price
level to real GNP and the deflator apply in the short run as in the long
run.
Endogenous Monetary Policy
The time has now come to consider possible effects of the oil shock
upon monetary policy. Suppose that we can write the money supplyreaction
function of the monetary authorities as
(29) log N =logN* + h• log (y/y*) + h log (P/P*) +
In logarithms, actual money equals expected money as predicted by lagged
variables systematically affecting central bank behavior plus negative1.6
coefficientstimes the innovations in output and the price level and a




Denotethe real—oil—price and money elasticities of these equations by
fe, ''re'and Then taking the log changes in equations (29) through
(31)and solving for ilog N yields
h f0 +h
(32) Elog N =1—h f h Llog 8
yNpM
Wehave seen above that f is negative andTris positive while h andh
0 0 y p
are both negative. Whether money is increased, decreased, or left unchanged
by the central bank depends both on the relative sizes of the output and
price effects anduponthe relative aversion of the central bank to reces-
sion and inflation. The denominator of (32) allows for attenuation of
money changes to the extent that there are within—period (positive) responses
in output and prices. Finally, the price level effect is obtained by sub-
stituting (32) into the log—change form of (31):
/(hf0+hlT0)1T\
(33)L1ogP= )log0 \ yMpM/
LdogP Here is the value of
slog 0
such as is computed in (28) for a given
nominal money supply and the ratio term is the additional (ambiguously
signed) effect due to endogenous nominal money supply changes.17
Simulationexperiments which allow for such endogenous movements in
the nominal money supply are reported below in Section III. It is perhaps
understandable why most analyses assume that the ambiguously signed change
in nominal money must be negligible and proceed on that basis. Onecanat
least explain the effect if the central bank were to hold money supply
unchanged.
Conclusions from Theory
Considering first the results of our analysis conditional upon a given
monetary policy, with resources at their natural employment levels, the
output elasticity with respect to the real price of oil is —y/(l —y)before
capital adjusts and —'/withfull capital adjustment. The parameter y, the
value share of oil imports used in producing domestic output, may be quite
small, certainly less than 0.02 for the United States for example. The
labor shareis on the order of 0.7 to 0.8, so the long run elasticities
vary from about y to l.3y or 1.4y. In the short—run, unemployment will
increase slightly (if aggregate demand is elastic), but the short—run output
elasticity seems to lie in the same range as for the long—run. The price
level is shifted up in the long—run by the long—run income elasticity of
money demand (around 1) times the output elasticity. In the short—run the
price level shifts less than in proportion to output since the short—run
aggregate demand curve is elastic.
These shifts in the levels of output and prices affect their growth
rates only during the transitional period. They may be reinforced or offset
by endogenous money supply reactions of the central bank. These reactions
depend on the relative aversion of the central bank to decreases in output
and increases in prices and so are ambiguous in sign a priori.18
Biases in the calculation of real value—added imply smaller elastic-
ities in absolute value for real GNP and the implicit price deflator than
for real output and the price level. Indeed, an increase in the real oil
price of the size which occurred in 1973—1974 implies that the logarithmic
change in real GNP would be less than half that for output.19
II. Tests for Structural Change in the Real—Income Equation
The behavior of the real price of oil is dominated by a downward
secular trend from the 1950s until the early 1970s as illustrated for the
United States in Figure 4. There was a small upward movement in 1971—1972,
but the major increase occurred in the second quarter of 1973 and especially
the first quarter of 1974. Widespread recessions in 1973—1975 provide the
major empirical evidence in support of a large real—income effect of oil
price increases. However, several alternative hypotheses focus on other
major events occurring roughly coincidentally.
The first of these alternative hypotheses points to the final breakdown
of pegged exchange rates in 1973 which permitted (previously) nonreserve
countries to regain control of their money supplies and to stop the infla-
tion imported from the United States. In the United States, meanwhile, the
Fed reduced money supply growth in mid 1973 and again in mid 1974. The
average reduction in the growth rate of the money supply in the eight
countries in our sample exceeded 5 percentage points. Obviously any estimate
of the effect of oil—price changes must account for the effect of these re-
strictive monetary shocks.
A second alternative hypothesis points to the widespread adoption of
price controls, following the U.S. lead in August 1971, and their subsequent
dismantling in the period 1973—1975. Such controls may have caused over-
statement of real GNP (and understatement of the GNP deflator) compared to
true values.21 When the controls were relaxed during 1973—1975, measured
real income fell back to its true value giving an illusion of a deeper
recession than was actually occurring or the occurrence of a recession when
there was none. Although it is possible to develop corrected estimates for20
real GNP and the deflator using physical unit series such as employment, car—
loadings, and components of the industrial production indices, that is a very
large job. The present paper will only examine whether estimated effects of
oil—price changes appear to be larger in those countries with coincident
price control relaxation. If so, future research will be indicated to dis—
entangle these oil and price control effects.
In examining the empirical data, it is also important to note that the
normal or natural growth rate of output has declined generally in the post-
war period. In the late 1940s, after a decade and a half of depression and
war, the world capital—labor ratio was very low relative to its balanced—
growth or steady—state value.22 As the capital stock approaches its steady—
state level, the growth rates of capital and hence real income decline
toward their steady—state values. If we were to impose a constant natural
growth rate, a spurious negative coefficient might be estimated for oil to
account for slowing growth in the 1970s.
The real GNP equations of the Mark III International Transmission Model
provide a convenient starting place for estimating the effect on output of
changes in the real price of oil.23 These equations were derived, following
Barro (1978), by combining a standard Lucas (1973) aggregate supply function
with an aggregate demand function with nominal money, real government spending,
and real exports as arguments. Specifically, they express the rational—
expectations/natural—rate approach as
• 3 A
(34)log y —logy_ a1 —a2(logt—l —log_) + Z a3+M_j
I=0
3 3
+ E a7+j + E a11÷j +
i—0 1=0
where the time subscripts are made explicit, is the natural—employment
level of real output In quarter t, and are the innovations in21
the aggregate demand variables log M, logarithm of real government expendi-
tures for goods and services, and exports divided by GNP, respectively.24
Thus in the absence of innovations or stochastic disturbance £,logy ad-
justs toward its natural level at the rate a2 per quarter. Innovations in
the determinants of aggregate demand affect log y with an unconstrained
four—quarter distributed lag to allow for any inventory adjustment lags.
To estimate the effect of the real oil price, it remains to specify
log appropriately. A form which allows for both declining natural out-
put growth as just discussed and for an oil price effect is
(35) log y b1 + b2t + b3t2 + b4 log O
A positive b2 and negative b3 implies a declining natural growth rate. The
parameter b4 estimates the full long—run value of Og .Ifthe expression
(35) were simply substituted in equation (34), an oil price change would
implicitly be assumed to have no immediate effect and then a partial adjust-
ment effect at the rate a2 per quarter. This is inconsistent with the
analysis of Section I in which it was shown that the short—run effect is
similar in magnitude to the long—run effect.25 So, as with the aggregate
demand variables, a four quarter distributed lag on the first difference of
log 0 to capture a rapid short—run adjustment process.
Substituting equation (35) in (34) and adding the short—run adjustment
process yields the estimating equation
(36) log y =a1+a2(b1
-
b2)+(1—
a2)logtl + a2b2t + a2b3(t
—1)2
+ a2b4 log + Za3+jN. + Ea7÷jj +
+Zc(log0t+1-i —log0t-i +22
This equation has been estimated using the 1957—1976 quarterly data set and
instruments for the eight countries in the Mark III International Transmission
Model. The regressions are based on the two—stage—least—squares—principal—
components (2SLSPC) technique because of the large number of predetermined
variables in the model.26 The coefficients of the aggregate demand variables
are not at issue here, are substantially the same as those discussed in Darby
and Stockman (1980), and so are omitted for the sake of brevity from the
present discussion.27
The regression results are summarized in Table 2. The coefficient of
log O is negative in every case although only 4 of the t—statistics meet
conventional levels of significance. The implicit estimate of the long—run
oil effect is reported in the ninth column as ranging from a 2 basis point
decrease in real income per percentage point increase in the real price of
oil for the U.S. to 19 basis points for Japan. Table 3 indicates the im-
plied long—run reduction in real income for the eight countries based on
the 19731—19761V increase inthe real price of oil. Rasche and Tatom
(1980, Table 7) prepared similar estimates for their model (discussed in
Section I) based on 1973—1977 energy price increases, and those estimates
are reported for comparison. Despite some differences in detail, the calcula-
tions here tell broadly the same story as that of Rasche and Tatom. However,
this strong story does not do so well under closer examination.
Let us first consider the possibility that the share of imported oil in
total output is so small that any effects are in fact negligible.. This is
tested by computing the F statistic for the hypothesis that all the oil co-
efficients are zero (He: a2b4c1c2 =c3
=
c40). As reported in
Table 2, only five of the countries have any statistically significant oil23
effect at the 5 percent level28 and for one of these (the United States) the
significant response is due to short—run movements which might be related
to various panic policy responses, briefly adopted here and abroad, to the
temporary OPEC embargo at the end of 1973. Further, the significant French
effects imply that French income was higher throughout 1973 as a
result of rising oil prices and so does not support the hypothesis.
Since experience indicates that the French, Italian, and Japanese data
may be quiteunreliable,29 let us focus on the results for the United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands. Of these five, the
F statistic is insignificant for Canada and Germany and significant for the
United States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Interestingly these
three countries with significant F statistics all removed general price
controls coincidentally with the 1973—1974 oil price increase while Canada
30
and Germany had no price controls during the relevant period. If, as I
have argued elsewhere (l976a, 1976b), the decontrol process results in the
elimination. of overstatement of real GNP built up during the control period,
then the spurious drop in reported real GNF relative to true GNP will be
captured as part (or all!) of the effect of the coincidental increase in
real oil prices. Certainly the pattern of significant oil effects only
where simultaneous decontrol occurred strongly indicates the value of
research to formulate real CNP estimates unbiased by price—control evasions
which overstate quantities and understate prices.
In summary, these empirical results give a rather ambiguous answer to
the question of whether or not a large increase in the real price of oil will
reduce significantly real income for given nominal money supplies, real
government spending, and real exports. Such a reduction is estimated for
half the cases, but this may be a spurious result due to the simultaneous
removal of price controls in those countries. -24
III. Simulation Experiments
To assess the effects of the 1973-1974 oil price increase on real in-
come ——andultimately the price level we must allow for induced changes
in nominal money supplies and real exports aside from any possible direct
effects such as examined in Section II. To take account of these indirect
effects, one must resort to a simulation model of some sort, and this sec-
tion reports results from the Mark IV Simulation Model described inDarby
(1981).31 The results of any one simulation model cannot be taken too
seriously except as they illustrate the possible importance of channels not
inconsistent with the data which might otherwise be overlooked. So with a
spirit of healthy scepticism, let us turn to the specific experiments.
To assess the effects of the oil price increase we compare the results
from simulating the model in one case with the actual real price of oil and
in another case with the real price of oil held constant at the 1973 I price.
The assumed difference in the logarithm of the real price of oil (log (ole))
isplotted in Figure 5. The dynamic simulations begin in 1973 II and con-
tinue for two years thereafter.32
In view of the mixed evidence for direct oil price effects on real in-
come as reported in Section II, the basic Mark IV model does not incorporate
such effects. An alternative simulation model, the Mark IV—Oil, was there-
fore estimated. It differs from the basic Mark IV model only in the addi-
tion to the real income equations of the variables listed in Table 2 above
for those 5 countries for which the oil variables were significant (United
States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and the Netherlands). These five
equations are listed with their estimated coefficients in Table 4.
Figures 6 through 10 illustrate the simulation results for the five
countries with reliable data, Each figure displays the simulated effect of25
the oil price increase on six major macroeconomic variables for one country.
The effect is estimated as the difference between the simulation values
based on the actual real price of oil and the values based on a constant
post—1973 I price. The effects simulated by the basic Mark IV model are
plotted with a square while those for the Mark IV—Oil are plotted with a
diamond.
Examining first Figure 6 for the United States, we see a considerable
difference depending on whether or not direct oil price effects appear in
the real income equation. In the basic Mark IV Model without those effects,
the simulated effect of the oil price increase is to increase real income by
stimulating exports. The price level rises a bit to a peak effect of 2.5
percent, despite the slight decrease in nominal money supply, because the
large rise in interest rates (due to increased exports) dominates the income
effect to produce a significant decline in the real quantity of money de-
manded. That is, the denominator in equation (2) above falls by more than
the numerator. The situation is much different for the Mark IV—Oil Mode].
with direct real income effects: Real income ——followinga brief initial
increase ——isreduced by up to 3 2/3 percent at the trough. This reduction
is caused both by the direct real income effects and ——inthe second year ——
bythe reversal of real export growth. The price level increase is almost
double that simulated in the basic model although simulated nominal money is
only a little higher. This is so because of much lower simulated y which
would much reduce mC(y,R) and hence increase p /mC(y,R) as compared to
the basic Mark IV Model simulations.
The simulated effects for the United Kingdom (see Figure 7) tell a
story similar to that for the United States. The main differences lie in
the simulated behavior of the nominal money stock and interest rates in the26
Mark IV—Oil Model. Because the estimated U.K. money—supply reaction func-
tion is responsive to unemployment but not inflation increases, unlike the
U.S., falling output induces substantial increases in nominal money. In the
U.S. Mark IV-Oil simulations the downward pressure on the interest rate due
to lower exports was roughly offset by upward pressure from increased infla-
tionary expectations. Inflationary expectations are much less important in
the estimated U.K. interest rate equation; so the lower level of exports in
the Mark IV—Oil Model case is reflected in lower interest rates. Nonetheless,
the much higher nominal money supply and lower real income dominate the some-
what lower interest rates in increasing p J,/mC(y,R). A minor difference
between the U.S. and U.K. simulations appears in the scaled balance of pay-
ments variable: For the U.S., this variable largely represents intervention
by other countries while for the U,K. it mainly represents minimal net inter-
vention in the floating exchange market by the British government.
The Canadian sectors of the basic Mark IV Model and of the Mark IV—Oil
Model are identical since the oil variables were found insignificant in the
Canadian real income equation in Section II. The differences in the simulated
effects thus represent the effects on Canada of lower foreign real income in
the Mark IV—Oil case. Thus the peak real income is only about 2 percent in
this case compared to about 3 2/3 percent with the basic model and so, given
the small simulated movements in nominal money and interest rates, prices
fall a bit less than in the basic model.
Like Canada, no direct oil—price effects are included in the German real—
income equation. The German real—income equation does display an anotnolous
cumulative negative impact of higher exports, however, so real income is
lower with the higher estimated exports in the basic Mark IV Model. Since more
than complete real crowding out of increased export expenditures is inconsistent
with a priori notions, the Germansimulationsare viewed as uninformative for27
this experiment.
The Netherlands real income equation in the Mark IV—Oil Model includes
direct oil effects and the real income simulation yields results similar to
although much larger than those obtained for the U.S. and U.K. The price
effects differ, however, for several reasons: (1) There is an anomolous, in-
significant, but negative coefficient on transitory income in the real money
demand equation; thus lower simulated real income implies higher simulated
real money demand. (2) The estimated interest rate coefficient in the real
money—demand function has the right sign but is trivial in magnitude.
(3) Nominal money is trivially lower in the Mark IV-Oil case due to some
simulated balance—of—payments effects. Thus the price effects simulated for
the Netherlands occur only because of coefficients which are consistent with
the data but not standard a priori notions.
These simulation results illustrate the large difference it makes
whether or not we take at face value the estimated real—oil—price effects in
the real income equations. We cannot say whether or not the 1973-1974 in-
creases in real oil prices caused price level increases on the order of0 to
3 percent or of 4 to 8 percent and upwards. Similarly real income effects
might range from slightly positive to about —10 percent for the countries
examined here. It is both the sorrow and challenge of our nonexperilnental
science that other things were not held constant when the oil price change
occurred. Onefactorwhich may explain the estimated real income effects in
1973—1974 was identified in Section II: the coincidental removal of price
controls in those countries for which real effects were found. Only much
further research can show whether the large simulated effects in the Mark
IV—Oil Model have a basis in reality or are the result of other changes ——
suchas price decontrol ——occurringin the same period.28
IV.Conclusions
The effects on real income and the price level of the 1973—1974 In—
creases in the real price of oil are the subject of strongly held but
diverse opinions.33 Unfortunately the results of this paper indicate that
a wide range of opinions is indeed consistent with the data. Perhaps we
should not be surprised that with effectively one degree of freedom it Is
difficult to have much confidence in estimates of both an oil price coef-
ficient and its standard error.
The Iranian hostage crisis of 1979—1980 will provide us data soon on a
second major move in the real price of oil. But these data are unlikely to
resolve the empirical question. It seems to this author that a more fruit-
ful avenue may be to develop quantitative measures of the biases in official
real output data due to price controls and then see what oil—price effects
are estimated using these corrected data. This approach is feasible because
price controls were generally imposed much before the oil price change.
Thus historical relationships between labor input, electricity production,
carloadings, and other physical unit series can be used to estimate the
biases up to the oil price change.
If this paper has demonstrated that the effects of the real—oil—price
increases in 1973—1974 remain an open question and thus stimulates research
towards answering it, then the author will be amply recompensed for having
to report such inconclusive conclusions.29
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Footnotes
'See Darby and Stockman (1980) for details.
fuller specification would include a factoreTt on the right hand
side, but it simplifies the notation without loss to choose labor units
such that the etS is eliminated and to incorporate technical progress T into
our measurement of labor in efficiency units. The basic results (8) and
(12) below are stated in Tatom (1979a, pp. 10—11) and Rasehe and Tatom (1980)
starting from the same production function (3). Their longest—runresults (l2),
however, are derived from the simple assertion that the marginal product of
capital is fixed in the long—run by supply conditions rather than as the
result of a growth analysis as is done below. Their assertion ——although
it is correct in this case ——isgenerally false. They erroneously interpret
the gross "rental price of capital" which is equated to the marginal product
of capital as "the relative price of capital" (e.g., Tatom (1979a, pp.10—11)) and
argue that this will equal its fixed supply price in the long—run.In the
appendix to Rasche and Tatom (1980), they instead have attempted to relate
changes in output to changes in capacity of individual firms, but this seems
to neglect the fact that the number of firms is not fixed.
In the main body of the paper they present evidence supportive of the
usage of a Cobb—Douglas production function of this form (3). Kopeke(1980)
argues that it is improper to include energy as an argumentin the aggregate
production function since energy is itself an intermediate product produced
by capital and labor. This objection does not apply to imported petroleum
which is produced by foreign labor and capital. Care must be taken, as seen
below, however in going from the domestic output concept appropriate to the34
production function (3) to the value—added concept of real GNP. Unfortunately
this last step has not been made in the three—factor analyses of the effects
of oil-price changes.
3This assumption is arguable also. For example, Phelps (1978) treated
the quantity of imported oilas determined erogenously; the nominal price
of oil is assumed fixed by Mork and Hall (1979) and by Berner, et al., (1977)
in their Multi—Country Model. Rasche and Tatom (1980) argue persuasively
that neither of these representations capture the meaning of OPEC's ability
to set an optimal real price of oil.
4The value of y is discussed atsome length below. To the extent that
capital is in the form of existing machines which cannot be readily modified
and which require fixed petroleum inputs, the quasi—rents of existing
machines will fall without any reduction in output or petroleum usage. A
possibly offsetting factor would be the premature obsolescence of machines
on which the quasi—rents fall below zero. Neither of these factors is
operative in full long—run equilibrium discussed imeediately below, and are
taken as negligible on net here.
5Before capital adjusts, but withresources fully employed the marginal
product of capital ka)' falls (slightly) withand hence so does the
real interest rate.
6That is 00 so that0—yO l—y
7klthough =0initially as seen at (17) as 0 increases, the
positive BBS term in (16) decreases while the negative BBS is unchanged.
The negative effect is yet greater if capital is allowed to adjust.35
8Notethat the first RHStermin (18) is approximately equal (for
small y) to y 1 —- whichillustrates that as 0 becomes large the adjust—
merit for imported inputs in measured GNPbecomestrivial and all output is
included in measured GNP.
9it is possible to apply theanalysis to energy more generally, but
the increase in y is largely offset by a reduced logarithmic change in 0.
10Rasche andTatom(1980), Table 6.
formal solution to this problem is presented in Darby (1979, Chap.5).
tax analysis is given little if anyweightin recent analyses.
Rasche and Tatom (1980),for example, term it "the 1974 view" and belief
thataggregate demand shifts were important appearsto have been an
ephemeralphenomenon. It isincluded here for the sake of completeness.
13The exact amount of these reductionsdepends on consumer expectations,
but the direction is unambiguous.
14There is no long—run effecton output or interest rates via this
channelunlessdifferences between foreign and domestic propensities to
save cause a shift in the domestic investment—output ratio.
'5The aggregate demand curveisderived by solving the IS relationship
for R and substituting in equation (2).
16 . . . Anegative sign indicates a shift to the left.
17Purvis(1975)displays the correct formula for which is
—l
d d 1ogm 1ogm
1ogy
'logR36
where iis or the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to
d
output on the IS curve. For a normal negativelysloped IS curve, J
will be positive but insufficient to bring the denominatorof up to 1 if
short—run interest elasticity of money demand is smalland the IS curve is
rather flat as argued by Hall (1977).
Rasche andTatom(1980) make a convoluted version of Ganib's error
(whichPurvis corrected) to conclude that the aggregate demand curve was
inelastic. Rather than accept the implication of increased employment,they
repeat their (l977a) assumption that nominal wagesrise freely once the
naturalunemployment rate is reached. I can see no justificationfor this
appendage to a basic search view of the labormarket. It is of course
irrelevant if <—1or the aggregate demand curve shifts to theleft
sufficiently to reduce employment despite an inelastic aggregatedemand
curve.
18If the elasticity of aggregate demand is less than —1 but greater
than — (about—1.5), the short—run effect will be greater than the
full—employment effect for agiven capital stock but less than the long—
run effect allowing for capital adjustment.That is, in the absence of
significant shifts in aggregate demand, the long—runeffects with full
capital adjustment such as calculated in Table 1exceed the short—run effects
unless <—/(—a)—1.5.
19More wage flexibility implies less employment variation, so output
would be lower than indicated by equation (24) if
>—land less if
<-1.
20The lack of a term in the balance of payments implies that we are
either dealing with a reserve country (the U.S.), a freely floatingcountry,37
or with a country which can and does sterilize balance of payments effects
in the relevant period; see Darby (1980). By the time of the first oil
shock (1973—1974) this is probably a reasonable characterization although
current balance of payment effects will also be present for some countries
in the simulations reported in Section III below.
21See Darby (1976a, 1976b).
22Even for the relatively unscathed United States, capital grew by
only about 0.4 percent per annum from 1929 through 1948 compared to a normal
growth rate of 3.2 percent; see Christensen and Jorgenson (1978, p. 56).
This implies that by 1948 the actual U.S. capital stock was less than 60
percent of the steady—state capital stock.
23See Darby and Stockman (1980) for a description of the model.
24The scaling of exports as a fraction of income rather than in
logarithmic terms was done to permit application ofthe balance—of—payments
identity in the model. In the results reported here all the innovations are
defined as residuals from optimal ARIMA processes applied to log M, log '
and(X/Y), respectively.
25lmmediately after an increase in the real oil price, the capital
stock is greater than in full long—run equilibrium while labor utilization
is less. The net effect depends on the elasticity rj of the aggregate demand
curve, but approximates the full long—run effect on plausible assumptions.
26The only current endogenous variables in equation (36) are ''
andlog U. Time t and government spending shocks are exogenousin the
model, but Mt and are endogenous. The price of oil in base—year dollars38
is exogenous so log 6 is exogenous for the U.S. For the other seven
countries endogenous movements in the purchasing power ratio make the real
price of oil in base—year domestic currency units endogenous, but they are
dominated by movements in the U.S. real price.
27To the extent these aggregate demand variables were correlated with
any significant oil variables added here, their numerical values were of
course affected. However, the general pattern and conclusions remained un-
altered from the earlier discussion cited in the text.
280n1y France is significant at the 1 percent level.
29See discussions in Darby and Stockman (1980) and Darby (1981).
30The United States took the lead in imposing price controls in August
1971 which Darby (1976a, 1976b) argues led to an increasing overstatement
of real GNP (and understatement of the deflator) through the first quarter
of 1973. Controls were then relaxed in phases through the third quarter of
1974 with progressive elimination of overstatement in real GNP. That is,
real income growth was overstated from 1971111 through 19731 and then under-
stated from 197311 through 19741V. According to Parkin in Shenoy (1978,
pp. 150—151) the United Kingdom followed a similar pattern with controls
instituted with a freeze in November 1972, peaking in their effect on the
data with the end of Stage II in August 1973, and eventually abandoned
entirely after the Conservative loss of February 1974. Shenoy (1978, pp.
132—135) reports a similar albeit more complex pattern for the Netherlands
beginning also with a 1972 price freeze. Carr (1976, p. 40) points out that
Canada was free of general price controls until October 1975, too late to
cause any biases in the oil—price coefficients. West Germany imposed no39
price controls on the ground that such policies distract attention from the
real problems; Shenoy (1978, pp. 138—141).
31The Mark IV Simulation Model is a simplified simulation version of
the Mark III International Transmission Wdel described in Darby and Stockrnan
(1980). The main simplifications involve (1) deletion of insignificant
variables except where they are required a priori to permit international
transmission and (2) combining variables to reduce multicollinearity where
a priori hypotheses on equality of coefficients were not rejected by the
data. The resulting model is thus both consistent with the data and
tractable for simulation. The Mark IV Model exists in versions corresponding
to pegged and floating exchange rates, but only the latter (Mark IV—FLT) is
used in this paper.
32 . Ina dynamic simulation, the input series are the exogenous variables
plus the initial conditions (endogenous variables at the beginning of the
simulation). The values of endogenous variables within the simulation
period are assigned their predicted values. As is common for a large model
with few exogenous variables, the cumulative errors in the endogenous vari-
ables eventually take the simulation off track. For the Mark IV Simulation
Model, this dynamic instability is not a significant difficulty until after
the first two years.
33Taking two of the best studies for the long—run U.S. real—income ef-
fect as examples: Nosworthy, Harper, and Kurize (1979, p. 412) report an
average reduction in productivity growth of 0.18 percent per annumfor 1973—
1978 which implies a total reduction in real income of 0.9 percent. By
contrast, Rasche and Tatom (1980), as reported in Table 3 above, estimate a
7.0 percent long—run effect.40
TABLE 1
Illustrative Calculations of MaximumLong—Run
Effect of 1973—1974 Real Oil Price Increase
No Capital Adjustment Full Capital Adjustment
y=O.O03 -y=O.O2 -y=O.O03 y=O.02
change in —0.0038 —0.0260 —0.0051 —0.0346
log output
(Alog y)





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Implied Estimates of Long—Run Decreasein Real GNP
due to 19731—19761V Increases in RealPrice of Oil
Ras the—Tat om
a log 019761V Long-Run Long—Run
Country —log019731
Decrease in qb Estimate c
United States —0.021 1.2119 —2.5% —7.0%
UnitedKingdom —0.057 1.2749 —7.3% —3.5%
Canada —0.047 1.1045 —5.2% —4.4%
France —0.095 1.1477 —10.9% —4.1%
Germany —0.039 1.1101 —4.3% —1.9%
Italy —0.035 1.3995 —4.9% NA
Japan —0.191 1.1402 —21.8% —17.1%
Netherlands —0.118 0.9856 —11.6% NA
Notes: a. This is the ratioof the estimated values of a2b4 to a2
from Table 2.
b. Product of the previous twocolumns.
c. From Rasche and Tatom(1980), Table 7, for 1973—1977energy—price increases.43
TABLE4














Note:The country index is j, log y is permanent income, and log ElogE
+ log RO where E is the exchange rate andRO is the index of
thereal price of a barrel of Venezuelan oil in1970 U.S. dollars.
COEFFICIENTS
Coefficient Values by Country (j)
Name United United France JapanNetherlands
States Kingdom
a. —0.0016 —0.0148 0.0843 0.2335 0.0668
jl
a. 0.1472 0.4631 0.5351 0.2116 0.2869
a. 0.8335 —0.1410 —0.2414 —— 0.1542
J3




a. 0.9220 —— —— —— —0.1044
a17
—— 0.1464 0.0487 —— 0.0625









0.0960 0.0959 0.0531 — 0.0222
a.
j,l0
0.0852 —— —— —0.0536 0.0398
n
1.4624 —— —0.1536 —0.8258 0.0352
a.
j,l2
1.0743 0.5147 —— —— —0.0231
a.
J,13
—— —— —— —0.6406 0.1660
cx14
—— —— —— —0.8563 —0.0236
ct20
0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 —0.0004
a,21
—0.0000 —0.0000 —0.0000 —0.0000 +0.0000
a22
0.0003 —0.0188 —0.0447 —0.0351 —0.0307
a,23
—0.0187 —0.0294 0.0089 —0.0481 —0.0269
a,24
—0.0231 0.0236 0.0500 0.0018 0.0257
a25
—0.0064 0.0213 0.0402 0.0104 0.0096
a 26
—0.0200 0.0073 0.0084 0.0024 0.0032
Note:TheMarkIV—Oil Modeldiffersfrom the MarkIV—FLT Simulation Model
onlyinthese fiveequations.A coefficientfor a suppressed
variable (t statistic less than 1 in absolute value; Qj3 through
only) is indicated bylog P
log y
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Figure4
The Logarithm of the United States Real Price of Imported Oil
Source: The dollar price index of Venezuelan crude oil is
taken from various issues of International Financial
Statistics and rebased to 1.00 in 1970. This is
then deflated by the U.S. GNP deflator (1970 =1.00)
to obtain 0 (01970 =1.00).
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Simulated Effects in the United States of the 1973—1975











(d) Short—Term Interest Rate ——






(f)Scaled Balance of Payments(B/Y)
Key: aEffectssimulated using basic Mark IV Model


















Simulated Effects in the United Kingdom of the 1973—1975






























(e) Scaled Exports ——(X/Y)
(f) Scaled Balance of Payments ——(B/Y)
Key: Effects simulated using basic Mark IV Model
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FIGURE 8
Simulated Effects in Canada of the 1973—1975
















(e) Scaled Exports ——(X/Y)CA
(f) Scaled Balance of Payments ——(B/Y)CA
Key: Effects simulated using basic Mark IV Model































Simulated Effects in Germany of the 1973—1975


















Key: Effects simulated using basic Mark IV Model
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(d) Short—Term Interest Rate—— RNE
FIGURE 10
SimulatedEffects in the Netherlands of the 1973—1975










































(f) Scaled Balance of Payments ——(B/Y)NE
Key: Effects simulated using basic Mark IV Model
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